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You'll Never Guess Which Nation Drinks The Most Tea Or Coffee
With a global market valued at more than $300 billion in 2026, tea is said to be the second most consumed hot beverage in the world.
As the United Nations notes, the tea industry provides "a major source of income and export earnings for some of the poorest countries and, thanks to its high labor requirements, generates numerous jobs, particularly in remote and economically disadvantaged areas."
Statista Consumer Insights surveyed 32 countries around the world to find out more about global tea drinking habits.
You will find more infographics at Statista
As Statista's Katharina Buchholz details below, the survey found that while tea was a popular choice for many adults, coffee is consumed by a higher share of people in almost every country included in the survey, except for Asian tea strongholds China, India and Japan.
However, the difference to the share of respondents consuming coffee was just 2-4 percent for China and Japan and 9 percent for India.
Coffee-loving nations, on the other hand, shun tea to a higher degree. This applies to Finland, famously a nation of coffee drinkers, where 74 percent said they drank coffee regularly and just 36 percent said the same about tea. But countries like this also exist in Asia, the continent most associated with tea. In the Philippines, 70 percent said they drank coffee and 31 percent said they drank tea on a regular basis. These numbers stood at 59 percent and 25 percent in South Korea.
In Western Europe and North America, nations typically see around 60 percent of regular coffee drinkers and around 40 percent of regular tea drinkers. In Latin American countries, this was closer to 70 percent and 50 percent, respectively. The share of tea drinkers is elevated in the United Kingdom at 56 percent, the Netherlands at 55 percent and Germany at 47 percent. In the United States, a comparatively low share of people said they drank coffee regularly (51 percent), which was surpassed by soft drinks (54 percent).
And so, to answer the headline question, the highest consumption of both tea and coffee was recorded in Gulf countries Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates at around 70 percent for each beverage.
Tyler Durden Wed, 08/05/2026 - 05:45New Signals Point To Another Possible Migrant Invasion Against Ceuta
The scenes from the Ceuta invasion were deeply alarming, as 60,000 predominantly military-aged men, many carrying no supplies, crossed from Morocco into the Spanish enclave. The invasion set off alarm bells across the West, reinforcing concerns that uncontrolled mass migration poses a major national security risk.
According to The Sun, there are new concerns that a second invasion of Ceuta could be "just days" away, as the outlet cites online posts warning it may be their [migrants] "last chance" to enter Europe.
Just kidding, this is the actual footage … pic.twitter.com/jYRpSWM24e
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) July 31, 2026The outlet continued:
Fears are also mounting convicted terrorists were among the tens of thousands of people who stormed the Spanish enclave last week, reports say.
. . .
But reports say the peninsula could see scenes of mayhem play out on the streets yet again, as plans are being made for another mass border crossing on August 15.
On social media, posts appear to be plotting another storming of the shores of Ceuta, with one message reading: "Everything will be seen that day."
Another appears to call for the creation of a WhatsApp group, saying: "Our appointment is on 15/08/2026."
The invasion prompted Italy to suspend Schengen arrangements with Spain and to secure its borders, while 22 EU leaders demanded "immediate action" to address the national security threat. Denmark's Mette Frederiksen, Italy's Giorgia Meloni, Germany's Friedrich Merz, and other European leaders warned:
"We cannot allow uncontrolled mass crossings, the instrumentalization of migration or other hybrid threats to create the perception that illegal entry into the European Union is possible."
Reports that emerged in recent days show that Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez's (unhinged socialist) claim that the migrants had been expelled from Ceuta may not have reflected the situation on the ground. Read the full report.
Years of open-border policies under Spain's socialist government may now be approaching a political breaking point. The invasion of military-aged men was so visible to the world in real time on X, making it increasingly difficult for lefty corporate media to reconstruct the narrative and gaslight the public into believing this was merely a humanitarian migration event. The images instead reinforced views of a coordinated border invasion and undercut the left-wing narrative framing such arrivals solely as poor migrants searching for milk and bread.
Related:
We noted last week:
Hopefully, common sense can return to the West: secure borders. And, really, hold those accountable for nation-killing open border policies.
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France's €107 Billion Deficit Shock: The Next Euro Debt Crisis?
Submitted by Thomas Kolbe
Tuesday marked another low point for European fiscal stability. France, a cornerstone of the euro system, confirmed once again that it remains a leading candidate and potential trigger for a future euro financial crisis.
According to the French Ministry of Finance, the deficit of the French central government amounted to around €107 billion by the end of June. These are staggering figures – a deficit that is 14.4 percent higher than originally planned by the government.
SourceUnless the government builds a fiscal firewall and no economic miracle occurs, the central government deficit could rise to around six percent this year. Not included are the gaps in the social security system, municipalities and regions, which account for an additional significant share of France’s overall deficit. It is possible that the second-largest economy in the European Union will end the year with an overall government deficit of around eight percent.
All budget plans would therefore become obsolete. Last year, the government was already calculating with a deficit of five percent – a figure that, under the originally defined Maastricht criteria, should have triggered an excessive deficit procedure. However, the euro debt club has long abandoned any fiscal restraints.
The problem lies not only on the revenue side. While government revenues recently increased by around 3.7 percent, expenditures rose by 5.4 percent at the same time. The state is growing faster than the economic base that is supposed to finance it.
Despite tax increases and difficult negotiations over spending cuts, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu has failed to slow down his country’s debt spiral even remotely.
French fiscal policy can no longer be taken seriously. Forecasts from Paris now have the half-life of the French prime ministers who have failed in increasingly shorter intervals.
The spectacle France is presenting to the world will have consequences. The debt struggle of the Grande Nation no longer concerns France alone, but the entire euro system and the European Union.
It is becoming increasingly clear that European policy over recent years has contributed to a dramatic loss of economic dynamism and productivity. France is facing political paralysis, a president without popular support and the ongoing disintegration of a society that maintains one of the largest welfare states in the world, with a government spending ratio of 57 percent, in an attempt to cover its social fractures.
Cultural alien migration has a price, and sooner or later that price inevitably becomes visible in fiscal policy.
France is also following the German model and constructing its own state economy through debt in an attempt to overcome a never-ending productivity crisis. It is remarkable that this belief in the healing power of central planning can be found throughout the European Union. Has nobody learned the fundamental lessons of history?
The more capital is redirected from the productive sectors of the economy into the construction of a political economy, the poorer the population becomes. This is how socialism works.
We know this pattern from Germany: The state is effectively consuming itself. The greater the damage caused by an expanding state economy in the productive sectors of society, the higher the tax burden and inflationary pressures will ultimately become.
Following this logic, France has raised several taxes over the past twelve months. Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu shifted additional burdens primarily onto companies and higher-income earners.
The special levy on large companies with revenues exceeding one billion euros was extended and is expected to generate around €7.3 billion in additional government revenue. In addition, an extended special tax on high incomes is expected to bring in around €650 million. Further measures complete the tax package. Overall, the additional revenues are intended to reduce the burden on the French budget by around €9 billion.
https://www.reuters.com/business/what-is-frances-2026-budget-2026-02-02/
Yet even this fiscal effort is completely out of proportion to the scale of the budget problem. Tax increases are merely treating the symptoms – they do not solve the structural crisis of the French welfare state.
The problems are similar to those in Germany. There are no serious efforts to resolve the migration crisis, no fundamental reform of social programs and no strategy to create new economic momentum through tax relief for the middle class.
France resembles a slow-motion car crash. Everyone sees the collision coming, yet nobody still has the strength to soften the impact.
What happens if the bond market lowers the thumb on France’s creditworthiness?
The rating agencies have already sent warning signals. Fitch downgraded France’s credit rating from AA− to A+ and pointed to the growing debt burden, political uncertainty and the lack of a sustainable path toward stabilizing public finances.
https://www.reuters.com/world/fitch-abaisse-dun-cran-la-note-de-la-france-2025-09-12/
We are witnessing the first signs of a new euro debt crisis emerging on the horizon. Looking back, we must recognize that politics found it easy for a long time to exploit the fiat credit money system and the ECB, integrated into the political process, in order to maintain the illusion of unlimited political feasibility.
Regardless of where in the EU: Politics continues to uphold the illusion that the welfare system has no limits as long as the flow of credit does not dry up.
Reassured and lulled into a false sense of security, nobody questions the political strategy that led to the economic disaster. Yet these quiet times may soon come to an end as interest rates on bond markets continue to rise.
* * *
About the author Thomas Kolbe, a German graduate economist, has worked for over 25 years, he has worked as a journalist and media producer for clients from various industries and business associations. As a publicist, he focuses on economic processes and observes geopolitical events from the perspective of the capital markets. His publications follow a philosophy that focuses on the individual and their right to self-determination.
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How Economic Power Has Shifted Over The Past 200 Years
Over the last 200 years, economic leadership has shifted from China to the British Empire, then to the United States, and increasingly back toward Asia.
This streamgraph, via Visual Capitalist's Gabriel Cohen, tracks how the share of global gross domestic product (GDP) held by major economies changed from 1820 to 2025. The visualization incorporates the latest available data from the Maddison Project Database, the COLDAT Colonial Dates Dataset, and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook.
All GDP figures are adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), accounting for differences in living costs and production across countries.
The table below shows how each economy’s share of world GDP changed across two centuries:
Economy Share of World GDP (%) 1820 1855 1890 1925 1960 1995 2025 🇨🇳 China 28.6% 21.1% 12.7% 8.9% 5.3% 9.5% 21.8% 🇺🇸 U.S. 2.3% 7.0% 14.6% 23.9% 24.5% 20.7% 14.7% 🇪🇺 EU — — — — — 17.0% 12.3% 🇮🇳 India — — — — 3.9% 4.3% 9.0% 🇯🇵 Japan 3.5% 2.9% 2.6% 3.8% 4.5% 7.9% 3.4% 🇷🇺 Russia / USSR 9.2% 7.1% 5.3% 5.2% 10.1% 2.5% 2.9% 🇬🇧 British Empire / Britain 23.1% 22.6% 20.7% 14.7% 6.3% 3.2% 1.9% 🇫🇷 France 4.8% 5.8% 5.2% 5.0% 4.1% — — 🇩🇪 Germany 4.3% 4.8% 6.4% 6.6% 6.7% — — Pax Britannica and the European YearsBritain was the first country in the world to industrialize. As a result, the British Empire became the world’s preeminent superpower during the 19th century, an era sometimes known as Pax Britannica because of the relative absence of conflict between the major powers.
In 1845, the British Empire, on which the sun famously “never set,” contributed nearly one-quarter (23.8%) of global GDP. India was the empire’s most economically significant possession before gaining independence in 1947.
The table below shows each economy’s peak share of world GDP, the year it reached that level, and its share in 2025:
Economy Peak Share (%) Peak Year 2025 Share (%) 🇺🇸 U.S. 29.7% 1944 14.7% 🇨🇳 China 28.6% 1820 21.8% 🇬🇧 British Empire / Britain 23.8% 1845 1.9% 🇪🇺 EU 17.9% 2007 12.3% 🇷🇺 Russia / USSR 10.2% 1956 2.9% 🇮🇳 India 9.0% 2025 9.0% 🇩🇪 Germany 8.8% 1913 🇯🇵 Japan 8.6% 1990 3.4% 🇫🇷 France 6.6% 1858The rest of Europe’s fortunes followed a similar trajectory. The French Empire reached its peak share in 1858, at 6.6%, while Germany peaked at 8.8% in 1913, on the eve of the First World War.
Following decades of war and declining influence on the world stage, several European economies joined together in the European Union. The bloc contributed 17.9% of global GDP in 2007, ahead of the global financial crisis, though its share later declined and was further reduced by the UK’s withdrawal in 2020.
The Fall of Empire and the Rise of the U.S.If the 19th century was the British century, the 20th was the American century. Like Britain before it, the U.S. became the world’s largest exporter for a time.
World War II marked a turning point in global economic leadership. By 1944, the U.S. accounted for 29.7% of world GDP, the highest share reached by any economy in the modern period covered by this dataset.
American economic dominance was supported by high-value industries and the country’s central role in global finance, manufacturing, and trade.
The U.S. also continues to dominate rankings of the world’s largest and most profitable companies today. It also is still the undisputed economic powerhouse in nominal GDP terms.
The Asian CenturyFor centuries, China was a center of the global economy. Political instability and its failure to keep pace with European industrialization contributed to a long decline in its share of world GDP during the 19th and 20th centuries.
Beginning in the late 20th century, economic reforms and China’s emergence as a global manufacturing hub helped it regain lost ground. By 2025, China accounted for 21.8% of world GDP, or more than one-fifth of the total.
The full dataset below shows each economy’s share of world GDP for every year from 1820 to 2025:
Year Share of World GDP (%) 🇨🇳 China 🇺🇸 U.S. 🇪🇺 EU 🇮🇳 India 🇯🇵 Japan 🇷🇺 Russia / USSR 🇬🇧 British Empire / Britain 🇫🇷 France 🇩🇪 Germany 1820 28.6% 2.3% — — 3.5% 9.2% 23.1% 4.8% 4.3% 1821 28.4% 2.4% — — 3.5% 9.2% 23.0% 5.2% 4.4% 1822 28.2% 2.5% — — 3.4% 9.2% 23.0% 5.0% 4.4% 1823 28.1% 2.5% — — 3.4% 9.2% 23.0% 5.1% 4.4% 1824 27.9% 2.6% — — 3.4% 9.2% 23.2% 5.2% 4.6% 1825 27.7% 2.7% — — 3.4% 9% 23.2% 5.0% 4.6% 1826 27.6% 2.8% — — 3.4% 9% 22.8% 5.1% 4.7% 1827 27.4% 2.9% — — 3.4% 9% 23.1% 5.0% 4.6% 1828 27.2% 2.9% — — 3.3% 9% 23.0% 4.9% 4.5% 1829 27.0% 2.9% — — 3.3% 9% 22.9% 5.0% 4.5% 1830 26.9% 3.1% — — 3.3% 8.7% 23.1% 4.9% 4.5% 1831 26.6% 3.4% — — 3.3% 8.7% 23.0% 5.0% 4.4% 1832 26.4% 3.6% — — 3.3% 8.7% 23.1% 5.4% 4.5% 1833 26.2% 3.8% — — 3.3% 8.7% 23.0% 5.2% 4.7% 1834 26.0% 3.7% — — 3.2% 8.7% 23.0% 5.2% 4.7% 1835 25.8% 3.9% — — 3.2% 8.4% 23.4% 5.4% 4.7% 1836 25.6% 4.0% — — 3.2% 8.4% 23.4% 5.2% 4.7% 1837 25.4% 4.0% — — 3.2% 8.4% 23.2% 5.3% 4.7% 1838 25.2% 4.0% — — 3.2% 8.4% 23.4% 5.5% 4.6% 1839 25.0% 4.2% — — 3.2% 8.4% 23.1% 5.3% 4.7% 1840 24.8% 4.1% — — 3.2% 8.3% 23.4% 5.6% 4.8% 1841 24.6% 4.1% — — 3.1% 8.3% 23.1% 5.7% 4.9% 1842 24.4% 4.2% — — 3.1% 8.3% 22.8% 5.5% 4.8% 1843 24.2% 4.3% — — 3.1% 8.3% 23.0% 5.8% 4.7% 1844 24.0% 4.7% — — 3.1% 8.3% 23.6% 5.9% 4.7% 1845 23.8% 4.9% — — 3.1% 8.2% 23.8% 5.7% 4.8% 1846 23.6% 5.0% — — 3.1% 8.2% 23.6% 5.7% 4.6% 1847 23.4% 5.2% — — 3.0% 8.2% 23.3% 6.2% 4.6% 1848 23.2% 5.5% — — 3.0% 8.2% 23.3% 5.8% 4.8% 1849 23.0% 5.4% — — 3.0% 8.2% 23.2% 5.9% 5.0% 1850 22.9% 5.5% — — 3.0% 7.7% 22.9% 6.0% 5.0% 1851 22.5% 5.9% — — 3.0% 7.7% 22.9% 5.8% 4.9% 1852 22.1% 6.3% — — 3.0% 7.7% 23.0% 6.1% 4.9% 1853 21.8% 6.9% — — 2.9% 7.7% 23.0% 5.8% 4.8% 1854 21.4% 7.0% — — 2.9% 7.7% 23.0% 6.0% 4.9% 1855 21.1% 7.0% — — 2.9% 7.1% 22.6% 5.8% 4.8% 1856 20.8% 7.3% — — 2.9% 7.1% 22.9% 6.0% 5.1% 1857 20.4% 7.3% — — 2.9% 7.1% 22.7% 6.3% 5.3% 1858 20.1% 7.4% — — 2.9% 7.1% 22.2% 6.6% 5.2% 1859 19.8% 7.7% — — 2.9% 7.1% 22.4% 6.1% 5.2% 1860 19.5% 8.0% — — 2.9% 7.1% 22.3% 6.5% 5.4% 1861 19.2% 8.0% — — 2.9% 6.8% 22.0% 6.0% 5.2% 1862 19.0% 8.3% — — 2.9% 6.1% 21.3% 6.4% 5.4% 1863 18.8% 9.0% — — 2.8% 7.3% 21.8% 6.6% 5.7% 1864 18.6% 9.4% — — 2.8% 6.0% 21.8% 6.6% 5.8% 1865 18.3% 9.0% — — 2.8% 5.4% 21.7% 6.3% 5.8% 1866 18.1% 9.1% — — 2.8% 6.6% 21.7% 6.3% 5.8% 1867 17.9% 9.5% — — 2.8% 5.6% 21.6% 5.8% 5.7% 1868 17.7% 9.7% — — 2.8% 5.7% 21.8% 6.3% 6.0% 1869 17.4% 10.0% — — 2.8% 5.6% 21.6% 6.4% 6.0% 1870 17.2% 9.8% — — 2.8% 7.2% 21.8% 5.8% 5.9% 1871 16.9% 10.1% — — 2.8% 5.9% 21.4% 5.7% 5.7% 1872 16.6% 10.3% — — 2.7% 6.3% 21.2% 6.1% 6.0% 1873 16.3% 10.6% — — 2.7% 6.3% 21.1% 5.6% 6.1% 1874 16.0% 10.3% — — 2.7% 7.6% 20.9% 6.2% 6.5% 1875 15.7% 10.7% — — 2.6% 5.8% 20.9% 6.2% 6.4% 1876 15.4% 10.6% — — 2.6% 5.8% 20.6% 5.6% 6.2% 1877 15.1% 10.7% — — 2.6% 7.1% 20.4% 5.8% 6.1% 1878 14.8% 11.0% — — 2.6% 7.3% 20.1% 5.6% 6.2% 1879 14.6% 12.1% — — 2.6% 6.1% 20.0% 5.2% 6.0% 1880 14.3% 13.3% — — 2.6% 5.6% 20.2% 5.5% 5.8% 1881 14.0% 13.5% — — 2.6% 7.1% 20.3% 5.7% 5.8% 1882 13.8% 14.1% — — 2.6% 6.1% 20.7% 5.8% 5.8% 1883 13.5% 14.1% — — 2.5% 6.3% 20.6% 5.7% 6.0% 1884 13.3% 14.1% — — 2.5% 6.2% 20.4% 5.5% 6.0% 1885 13.1% 13.9% — — 2.5% 5.5% 20.2% 5.3% 6.1% 1886 12.8% 14.1% — — 2.6% 5.2% 19.8% 5.3% 6.0% 1887 12.6% 14.4% — — 2.6% 6.1% 20.4% 5.2% 6.1% 1888 12.6% 14.1% — — 2.4% 5.8% 20.6% 5.2% 6.2% 1889 12.7% 14.7% — — 2.5% 5.4% 20.5% 5.2% 6.3% 1890 12.7% 14.6% — — 2.6% 5.3% 20.7% 5.2% 6.4% 1891 12.5% 14.9% — — 2.4% 4.8% 19.6% 5.3% 6.2% 1892 12.3% 16.1% — — 2.5% 5.2% 19.6% 5.3% 6.4% 1893 12.2% 15.0% — — 2.5% 5.9% 19.4% 5.3% 6.6% 1894 12.0% 14.3% — — 2.7% 6.6% 19.8% 5.4% 6.6% 1895 11.9% 15.7% — — 2.7% 6.1% 19.5% 5.2% 6.8% 1896 11.7% 15.1% — — 2.5% 6.7% 18.9% 5.3% 6.9% 1897 11.6% 16.2% — — 2.5% 6.5% 20.1% 5.1% 7.0% 1898 11.4% 16.3% — — 2.9% 6.6% 20.3% 5.3% 7.1% 1899 11.2% 17.4% — — 2.7% 7.0% 19.7% 5.5% 7.2% 1900 11.1% 17.5% — — 2.7% 6.8% 19.6% 5.3% 7.4% 1901 10.9% 19.2% — — 2.7% 7.0% 19.5% 5.1% 7.1% 1902 10.7% 19.1% — — 2.5% 7.6% 20.2% 5.0% 7.2% 1903 10.6% 19.7% — — 2.8% 7.1% 20.1% 5.0% 7.4% 1904 10.4% 19.1% — — 2.7% 7.8% 19.9% 5.0% 7.6% 1905 10.2% 20.2% — — 2.6% 6.9% 19.8% 5.0% 7.7% 1906 10.0% 22.2% — — 2.9% 6.6% 20.2% 5.0% 7.8% 1907 9.9% 22.2% — — 2.9% 6.4% 19.7% 5.1% 8.0% 1908 9.7% 20.1% — — 2.9% 7.0% 19.1% 5.0% 8.0% 1909 9.5% 22.0% — — 2.8% 7.2% 20.1% 5.1% 8.0% 1910 9.4% 21.7% — — 2.8% 7.8% 20.2% 4.7% 8.2% 1911 9.3% 22.0% — — 2.9% 7.2% 20.2% 5.1% 8.3% 1912 9.6% 22.5% — — 2.9% 7.8% 20.1% 5.5% 8.5% 1913 10.0% 22.9% — — 2.9% 8.2% 20.1% 5.3% 8.8% 1914 9.9% 20.6% — — 2.8% 7.7% 20.2% 4.9% 7.3% 1915 9.9% 20.8% — — 3.0% 7.8% 20.3% 4.7% 6.9% 1916 9.9% 23.1% — — 3.4% 6.8% 20.5% 4.9% 6.8% 1917 9.8% 22.1% — — 3.5% 5.8% 20.1% 4.1% 6.7% 1918 9.8% 23.5% — — 3.5% 3.5% 18.8% 3.1% 6.6% 1919 9.8% 23.2% — — 3.8% 3.0% 16.3% 3.6% 5.3% 1920 9.7% 22.5% — — 3.4% 2.9% 14.5% 4.2% 5.6% 1921 9.5% 21.4% — — 3.7% 2.6% 14.1% 3.9% 6.1% 1922 9.4% 21.9% — — 3.7% 2.9% 14.7% 4.5% 6.5% 1923 9.2% 24.1% — — 3.6% 3.3% 14.3% 4.6% 5.3% 1924 9.0% 24.1% — — 3.7% 4.2% 14.6% 5.1% 6.0% 1925 8.9% 23.9% — — 3.8% 5.2% 14.7% 5.0% 6.6% 1926 8.7% 24.8% — — 3.7% 5.8% 14.4% 5.0% 6.6% 1927 8.5% 24.3% — — 3.6% 6.1% 14.6% 4.8% 7.1% 1928 8.4% 23.9% — — 3.8% 6.4% 14.5% 5.0% 7.2% 1929 8.2% 24.6% — — 3.9% 6.4% 14.7% 5.2% 7.0% 1930 8.2% 21.8% — — 3.5% 6.6% 14.4% 5.0% 6.8% 1931 8.0% 19.9% — — 3.5% 6.6% 13.7% 4.5% 6.1% 1932 8.1% 16.5% — — 3.7% 6.4% 13.4% 4.2% 5.5% 1933 7.1% 15.6% — — 3.9% 6.5% 13.2% 4.3% 5.8% 1934 7.1% 16.5% — — 3.8% 7.0% 13.4% 4.2% 6.1% 1935 7.5% 18.2% — — 3.9% 7.8% 12.9% 4.0% 6.4% 1936 7.8% 19.5% — — 4.0% 8.3% 13.2% 4.1% 6.8% 1937 7.4% 20.5% — — 4.1% 8.9% 13.0% 4.2% 7.1% 1938 7.0% 18.8% — — 4.2% 8.8% 12.8% 4.1% 7.5% 1939 6.8% 19.7% — — 4.7% 9.2% 12.7% 4.3% 8.0% 1940 6.5% 20.8% — — 4.7% 8.8% 13.1% 3.5% 7.9% 1941 6.4% 23.5% — — 4.8% 8.3% 13.7% 2.7% 8.3% 1942 6.2% 25.8% — — 4.8% 7.9% 13.8% 2.4% 8.3% 1943 6.1% 27.9% — — 4.7% 7.6% 14.0% 2.3% 8.4% 1944 6.0% 29.7% — — 4.7% 7.2% 13.5% 1.9% 8.5% 1945 5.8% 28.8% — — 3.5% 6.8% 12.9% 2.0% 6.0% 1946 5.7% 25.9% — — 2.6% 6.5% 12.2% 3.0% 2.8% 1947 5.5% 25.2% — 4.2% 2.6% 7.2% 7.0% 3.3% 3.1% 1948 5.4% 26.2% — 4.2% 2.8% 8.1% 8.0% 3.5% 3.7% 1949 5.3% 25.4% — 4.2% 2.8% 8.9% 8.2% 3.9% 4.2% 1950 5.2% 27.4% — 4.2% 3.0% 9.6% 8.1% 4.2% 5.0% 1951 6.0% 28.2% — 4.1% 3.3% 9.2% 8.0% 4.2% 5.2% 1952 6.4% 27.9% — 4.0% 3.5% 9.4% 7.7% 4.1% 5.4% 1953 6.9% 27.9% — 4.1% 3.6% 9.4% 7.6% 4.1% 5.6% 1954 6.2% 26.5% — 4.1% 3.6% 9.4% 7.7% 4.1% 5.8% 1955 6.4% 27.1% — 4.0% 3.7% 9.7% 7.6% 4.1% 6.1% 1956 6.7% 26.4% — 4.0% 3.8% 10.2% 7.3% 4.1% 6.2% 1957 6.5% 25.7% — 3.8% 3.9% 9.9% 7.0% 4.2% 6.3% 1958 6.3% 24.3% — 3.9% 4.0% 10.2% 6.7% 4.1% 6.3% 1959 5.8% 25.0% — 3.8% 4.2% 9.6% 6.7% 4.0% 6.5% 1960 5.3% 24.5% — 3.9% 4.5% 10.1% 6.3% 4.1% 6.7% 1961 4.1% 23.8% — 3.8% 4.8% 10.1% 6.1% 4.1% 6.6% 1962 4.2% 24.0% — 3.7% 5.0% 9.9% 5.7% 4.2% 6.6% 1963 4.6% 23.9% — 3.7% 5.1% 9.2% 5.3% 4.2% 6.4% 1964 4.9% 24.0% — 3.8% 5.4% 9.9% 5.3% 4.3% 6.5% 1965 5.2% 24.3% — 3.5% 5.5% 9.9% 5.1% 4.2% 6.5% 1966 5.2% 24.6% — 3.3% 5.8% 9.9% 5.0% 4.2% 6.3% 1967 4.9% 24.0% — 3.4% 6.1% 9.9% 4.8% 4.2% 6.0% 1968 4.6% 23.9% — 3.4% 6.5% 9.9% 4.7% 4.2% 6.1% 1969 4.8% 23.5% — 3.4% 7.0% 9.6% 4.6% 4.3% 6.2% 1970 5.2% 22.4% — 3.4% 7.4% 9.8% 4.5% 4.3% 6.1% 1971 5.3% 22.2% — 3.3% 7.4% 9.7% 4.3% 4.3% 6.1% 1972 5.2% 22.6% — 3.2% 7.8% 9.4% 4.3% 4.4% 6.1% 1973 5.4% 22.9% — 3.2% 8.1% 9.8% 4.4% 4.4% 6.1% 1974 5.4% 22.0% — 3.1% 7.7% 9.7% 4.2% 4.4% 6.0% 1975 5.5% 21.2% — 3.3% 7.6% 9.4% 4.1% 4.2% 5.7% 1976 5.1% 21.4% — 3.2% 7.6% 9.5% 4.0% 4.2% 5.8% 1977 5.2% 21.6% — 3.3% 7.7% 9.3% 3.9% 4.2% 5.7% 1978 5.6% 22.0% — 3.4% 7.8% 9.2% 3.9% 4.2% 5.6% 1979 5.8% 21.9% — 3.1% 7.9% 8.8% 3.9% 4.2% 5.7% 1980 5.9% 21.1% — 3.2% 7.8% 8.5% 3.6% 4.1% 5.5% 1981 5.9% 21.0% — 3.3% 7.8% 8.3% 3.5% 4.0% 5.4% 1982 6.3% 20.0% — 3.3% 7.8% 8.3% 3.4% 4.0% 5.2% 1983 6.5% 20.2% — 3.4% 7.8% 8.3% 3.5% 3.9% 5.1% 1984 7.0% 21.1% — 3.5% 7.8% 8.2% 3.4% 3.8% 5.1% 1985 7.4% 21.2% — 3.5% 8.0% 8.0% 3.5% 3.8% 5.0% 1986 7.7% 21.3% — 3.5% 8.0% 8.1% 3.5% 3.8% 5.0% 1987 8.1% 21.4% — 3.6% 8.0% 8.0% 3.5% 3.7% 4.9% 1988 8.3% 21.7% — 3.9% 8.3% 7.9% 3.6% 3.8% 5.0% 1989 8.1% 21.8% — 4.0% 8.4% 7.8% 3.6% 3.8% 5.0% 1990 7.9% 21.5% — 4.1% 8.6% 7.4% 3.5% 3.8% 4.7% 1991 7.9% 20.7% — 4.0% 8.6% 6.8% 3.4% 3.7% 4.8% 1992 8.2% 20.8% — 4.0% 8.4% 3.4% 3.2% 3.7% 4.8% 1993 8.7% 20.6% 15.8% 4.1% 8.1% 3.1% 3.2% — — 1994 9.0% 20.8% 15.8% 4.2% 7.9% 2.6% 3.2% — — 1995 9.5% 20.7% 17.0% 4.3% 7.9% 2.5% 3.2% — — 1996 9.8% 20.8% 16.8% 4.5% 7.8% 2.4% 3.2% — — 1997 9.8% 21.0% 16.8% 4.5% 7.7% 2.4% 3.2% — — 1998 9.5% 21.2% 16.9% 4.6% 7.3% 2.2% 3.1% — — 1999 9.6% 21.5% 16.9% 4.7% 7.1% 2.4% 3.1% — — 2000 9.9% 21.6% 17.1% 4.7% 7.0% 2.6% 3.1% — — 2001 10.2% 21.0% 16.9% 4.7% 6.8% 2.7% 3.1% — — 2002 10.5% 20.5% 16.5% 4.7% 6.5% 2.7% 3.0% — — 2003 10.7% 20.2% 16.1% 4.8% 6.3% 2.9% 3.0% — — 2004 11.1% 20.2% 17.6% 5.0% 6.2% 3.0% 3.0% — — 2005 11.7% 20.0% 17.4% 5.1% 6.1% 3.2% 3.0% — — 2006 12.4% 19.7% 17.4% 5.3% 5.9% 3.4% 2.9% — — 2007 13.0% 19.3% 17.9% 5.5% 5.8% 3.6% 2.9% — — 2008 13.0% 18.5% 17.5% 5.6% 5.5% 3.7% 2.7% — — 2009 13.4% 17.2% 16.2% 5.8% 5.0% 3.4% 2.5% — — 2010 14.3% 17.0% 16.0% 6.0% 5.0% 3.5% 2.4% — — 2011 14.7% 16.6% 15.8% 6.2% 4.8% 3.6% 2.4% — — 2012 15.3% 16.4% 15.2% 6.3% 4.7% 3.6% 2.3% — — 2013 16.0% 16.2% 14.7% 6.4% 4.6% 3.5% 2.3% — — 2014 16.6% 16.0% 14.5% 6.7% 4.5% 3.4% 2.3% — — 2015 17.1% 15.8% 14.3% 6.9% 4.4% 3.2% 2.3% — — 2016 17.7% 15.6% 14.1% 7.3% 4.3% 3.1% 2.2% — — 2017 18.2% 15.4% 14.0% 7.5% 4.2% 3.1% 2.2% — — 2018 18.8% 15.3% 13.8% 7.7% 4.1% 3.0% 2.2% — — 2019 19.4% 15.2% 13.6% 7.9% 4.0% 3.0% 2.1% — — 2020 20.4% 15.2% 13.2% 7.5% 3.9% 3.0% 2.0% — — 2021 20.8% 15.2% 13.1% 7.8% 3.8% 3.0% 2.0% — — 2022 20.7% 15.0% 13.1% 8.1% 3.7% 2.9% 2.0% — — 2023 21.2% 14.9% 12.8% 8.4% 3.6% 2.9% 1.9% — — 2024 21.5% 14.8% 12.5% 8.7% 3.5% 2.9% 1.9% — — 2025 21.8% 14.7% 12.3% 9.0% 3.4% 2.9% 1.9% — —Together, China and India accounted for 30.8% of global GDP in 2025. Their large populations and lower production costs give both countries greater weight when output is measured using purchasing power parity.
Whether this shift continues will depend partly on how China addresses demographic pressures similar to those facing Japan and the European Union, as well as broader challenges related to productivity and economic growth.
To see how the world’s major Western industrialized economies are losing GDP share, read The G7’s Share of Global GDP is Shrinking on Voronoi, the new app from Visual Capitalist.
Tyler Durden Wed, 08/05/2026 - 04:15