Authored by Rick Fisher via The Epoch Times,
As the United States pursues its goal of sending astronauts to the moon starting in 2028 to start building lunar bases—and China pursues its goal of sending its people to the moon by 2029 or 2030, also to start building lunar bases—it is necessary to consider a lunar political-military stability based on dual-use technologies.
Concern that China could behave aggressively on the moon is justified based on its behavior on Earth: an unwillingness to recognize the territory of neighboring states while mounting militarized aggrandizement against Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and India.
This behavior does not bode well for China’s willingness to be transparent about its intentions on the moon, while being predisposed to defend claimed areas rather than seeking deconfliction should other countries pursue nearby lunar activities.
This becomes more of a concern for two additional reasons.
First, both China and the United States are targeting lunar bases for the south pole of the moon due to the greater probability of finding water ice, but as National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Moon Base Program Executive Carlos Garcia-Galan noted in the agency’s March 24 “Ignition” briefing, this region is about the size of the state of Virginia.
Second, while Virginia is not a small state, China’s early moon landing system will employ two stages: a manned or cargo stage that is decelerated near the moon by a second propulsion stage that detaches and then crashes into the lunar surface.
For China, use of the propulsion stage is needed because its initial Long March-10 lunar space launch vehicle (SLV) can only loft about 26 tons to the moon, thus requiring two Long March-10 launches to put people on the moon, and use of a propulsion stage lowers the weight of the lunar landing system.
So far, Chinese state-affiliated sources have revealed that their Lanyue manned lunar lander and a larger pressurized lunar rover will be transported to the moon using the crashing propulsion stage, but it is likely that other payloads will do so as well.
For decades, the Chinese regime has tolerated the crashing of SLV first stages into populated areas, so it is a legitimate concern that Beijing will be similarly cavalier about the potential dangers to other countries’ lunar settlements posed by crashing Chinese propulsion stages.
It is certainly preferable to deconflict lunar basing plans, something that could be done between NASA and Chinese space officials who attend the annual International Astronautical Congress, which brings together space officials and engineers.
But China’s decades-long refusal to consider transparency and controls over its nuclear weapons does not bode well for its willingness to ensure that other countries are not “bombed” by its 5- to 8-ton moon-crashing propulsion stages.
As such, it is necessary to have a backup plan that can “deter” China from aggressive behavior on the moon and to defend against potentially dangerous behaviors, such as refusing to prevent threats from its moon-based propulsion stages.
A Long March-2F carrier rocket, carrying the Shenzhou 20 spacecraft and a crew of three astronauts, lifts off from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in the Gobi Desert on April 24, 2025. Pedro Prdoa/AFP via Getty Images
By now, it’s also possible to discern that both the United States and China are preparing to deploy “dual-use” systems to the moon that could serve defensive-military objectives, offering the possibility of a system of lunar deterrence.
Lunar Satellites: Both the United States and China plan to deploy small constellations of satellites around the moon for surveillance of the lunar surface and to enable lunar navigation and intra-lunar and Earth-moon communication.
Since 2024, China has deployed its Queqiao-2 communication relay satellite to the far side of the moon, supported by two small Tiandu navigation-communication development satellites.
By 2050, China intends that Queqiao will host a large number of communication, surveillance, and navigation satellites, enabling missions to the moon, Venus, and Mars, and even further into the solar system.
NASA intends to deploy two groups of five lunar satellites in 2027 and 2028 to perform surveillance, navigation, and communication missions.
Both China and the United States could use their lunar satellite constellations to support military objectives on the moon, and both are developing “combat” satellites for low Earth orbit operations, which, if needed, could also be deployed to lunar orbits.
Moon Hoppers: For its next Change-7 unmanned moon probe mission later this year to the far side of the moon, China will test a small “moon hopper,” an unmanned vehicle able to fly or hop into a nearby moon crater to search for water ice.
On March 24, NASA revealed that it intends to deploy three groups of four hopping vehicles to the moon in 2028, 2030, and 2032—a total of 12 such vehicles.
Even early, small hopping vehicles like China’s could swap out their small science payload for a small electromagnetic pulse grenade that could disable unshielded electronics at the target moon base. The fact that both could use their hopping vehicles as Earth-bound unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) would add to deterrence.
Lunar Nuclear Power: On March 24, NASA revealed its intention to develop space nuclear-thermal power systems to propel a nuclear-thermal powered spacecraft to Mars in 2028, with that power system also serving as the basis for a lunar-based nuclear power system for U.S. bases on the moon, to compensate for the loss of solar power during the “lunar night.”
Co-developed with the U.S. Department of Energy, the plan is to deploy a 40- to 100-kilowatt fission power system to the moon by 2030 or 2031 to provide reliable power for U.S. unmanned and manned moon base systems.
Chinese literature also reveals the intention to develop space nuclear power, both to propel spacecraft into deep space and to generate electricity for Chinese lunar bases, with a prototype space reactor reported to have been completed in 2023.
As fear of retaliation is the basis for nuclear deterrence on Earth, there would be a similar fear of retaliation that would deter attacks against lunar nuclear power stations, which would threaten personnel and contaminate a lunar base, thus preventing recovery and rebuilding.
But as a lunar nuclear power station would power lunar habitats and lunar rovers, it could also power future lunar mining lasers, which may also be inherently “dual-use”—an early lunar “artillery.”
With the May 4 signature of Ireland and Malta, there are now 66 nations that have signed the 2020 Artemis Accords principles for transparent and peaceful behavior on the moon, which form the basis for future U.S. cooperation on the moon with all Artemis partners.
As the leader of the Artemis “coalition,” the United States should try to achieve lunar deconfliction with China, especially to prevent errant Chinese propulsion modules from posing a threat to Artemis coalition lunar activities.
However, inasmuch as the Chinese Communist Party may regard dominance on the moon as a necessary tool for achieving future hegemony on Earth, the United States may have to lead its Artemis partners in making sure that “dual-use” technologies are deployed in a way that creates a system of lunar deterrence.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times or ZeroHedge.
Tyler Durden Wed, 05/06/2026 - 21:45One week ago, Microsoft expected roughly $190 billion in AI data center spending for this fiscal year, highlighting the massive scale of the hyperscaler capex cycle as Big Tech races to build out compute infrastructure. Across the tech space, hyperscalers are expected to spend nearly $700 billion in capex this year alone.
The incredible amount of capex being deployed this year has forced some tech giants to slash headcount and trim operating costs to free up capital for data centers. At the same time, Microsoft may now delay or abandon its ambitious 2030 "100/100/0" clean-energy target for data centers as costs continue to mount.
Bloomberg reports MSFT is set to nuke its pre-AI-era climate commitment, which aimed to match 100% of its electricity use, 100% of the time, with "green" energy by 2030, due to the mounting costs of going green.
MSFT wanted every hour of electricity used by its offices and data centers to be matched with clean energy purchases. The reality of saving the planet in a pre-AI era has collided with costs and power constraints as renewable energy struggles to keep pace with data center buildouts.
"The costly and energy-intensive buildout of data centers is affecting views on the feasibility of climate commitments made before the AI era," according to the outlet, citing one person familiar with the matter.
MSFT is reportedly adding about 1 gigawatt of data center capacity every three months (enough to power 750k homes) and expects to spend about $190 billion on data center buildouts this year. The tech giant recently held talks with Chevron to fund a major natural gas plant in the West Texas Permian Basin.
"AI is an existential fight for survival for Big Tech, and so all and any funds at their disposal are being diverted to building as much AI as possible," Alexia Kelly of the High Tide Foundation told the outlet.
MSFT's emissions have already jumped 23% from the pre-AI chatbot era, while Meta, Google, and Amazon have seen similar spikes as well.
The possible move by MSFT to dial back its climate pledges comes as data center buildout costs mount, and the tech giant is doing everything possible to trim those costs to ensure it continues to lead the hyperscaler race. Most importantly, it wants to lead the AI race against China, where data centers are predominantly powered by coal.
The need for cheaper power costs by MSFT also comes at a very precarious time for the entire AI buildout narrative, as cracks are beginning to emerge. Read the full report here.
Tyler Durden Wed, 05/06/2026 - 21:20