Authored by Joseph Solis-Mullen via The Libertarian Institute
Barely four years after the Pretoria Agreement formally ended one of the deadliest wars of the twenty-first century, serious fighting has returned to northern Ethiopia. As we begin October, Tigrayan forces have seized the airports at Mekelle, Aksum, and Shire, launched coordinated attacks into neighboring Afar and Amhara regions, and declared themselves once again in a state of full-blown war with the federal government in Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian military responded with drone strikes, artillery, and claims to have killed or captured hundreds of attackers. Flights were suspended, telecommunications disrupted, and civilians in Tigray began stocking food and cash in anticipation of another blockade.
In March of this year I warned in these pages that "the Horn of Africa is ready to explode" -pointing to unresolved territorial disputes, incomplete implementation of the Pretoria deal, military buildups, and the dangerous realignment of forces around Ethiopia, Tigray, and Eritrea. That assessment has, unfortunately, proven accurate. That fragile peace has given way to open conflict, and the risk of a wider regional conflagration is now higher than at any point since 2022.
Ethiopian soldiers, file imageThe 2020–2022 Tigray War left somewhere in the area of 600,000 dead, millions displaced, and large parts of the region in ruins. Ethiopian federal forces, Amhara militias, and Eritrean troops fought the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in a campaign marked by mass atrocities, famine, and ethnic cleansing. The Pretoria Agreement called for a cessation of hostilities, disarmament of Tigrayan forces, restoration of services, and an interim administration. Implementation was partial at best. Disarmament remained incomplete. Territorial disputes in the center, north, and northwest of country went unresolved—including occupation of parts of Tigray by Eritrea. Political power struggles inside the TPLF eventually produced a hardline faction that reasserted control, reinstated the pre-war regional government, and began mobilizing and conscripting fighters.
By early August 2026, lower-level clashes had already resumed near the Sudanese border. Federal drone strikes followed. In mid-September the TPLF announced an alliance with six other armed groups, including elements of the Amhara Fano, with whom it has a fraught history and territorial dispute, aimed at removing Abiy’s government. Days later the airports fell and fighting spread. The former adversaries now appear to be cooperating on the battlefield against a common enemy in Addis Ababa.
This temporary marriage of convenience is one of the most striking features of the current round.
Equally significant is the role of Eritrea. During the last war, despite their history of enmity, Eritrean forces fought alongside the Ethiopian army against the TPLF. Relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara have since deteriorated sharply. Unsurprising, as since 2023 Abiy Ahmed’s Ethiopia has repeatedly emphasized the need of securing Red Sea access—particularly through the Eritrean port of Assab, which has understandably alarmed President Isaias Afwerki’s government. Ethiopian officials have accused Eritrea of financially and materially supporting the TPLF and the broader anti-government alliance. Eritrea denies the charges. Independent verification of direct combat involvement remains limited, yet the strategic logic is clear: a weakened or distracted Ethiopia reduces the immediate threat to Eritrean territory and ports.
Sudan adds another combustible layer. As I examined in detail earlier this month in “Could Washington Pick a Side in Sudan’s Civil War?” the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has already drawn in a complex web of external actors —the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Israel, and others—whose interests increasingly center on Red Sea security, ports, and the strategic geography of the Horn. Ethiopia has been accused of allowing the RSF to train and stage operations from its territory; the SAF has, in turn, been accused of hosting or assisting Tigrayan fighters. Neither claim has produced confirmed large-scale intervention in the present fighting, but the proxy relationships are already in place. A major escalation in western Tigray could easily merge the two wars, turning northern Ethiopia into another front in the broader contest over the approaches to the Red Sea.
This pattern of interlocking crises is not new. In “Washington and Africa Are Intertwining Their Chaos,” I illustrated how U.S. policy across the continent has repeatedly transformed local conflicts into regional infernos through arms, training, intelligence partnerships, and the selection of favored clients. Somalia remains the clearest long-running example. As I detailed in “The Opportunity Costs of Our War in Somalia,” more than two decades of American airstrikes and special operations have failed to defeat al-Shabaab, have helped create the conditions for its rise in the first place, and continue to consume resources while delivering no measurable benefit to the American people. The same institutional habits that sustain that campaign—inertia, bureaucratic self-interest, and the refusal to acknowledge failure—are precisely what raise the risk that Washington will eventually feel compelled to “do something” as the Horn destabilizes further.
From a military perspective, Abiy’s government enters this round in a stronger position than in 2020. It possesses a substantial arsenal of drones that proved decisive in the later stages of the previous conflict, and the federal army is larger. Yet it is also stretched by ongoing insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia. The TPLF has reconstituted forces, secured at least temporary local allies, and demonstrated the ability to seize key infrastructure quickly. Neither side appears confident of a rapid, decisive victory. Both appear willing to risk another prolonged and catastrophic war.
Outside powers have so far limited themselves to calls for de-escalation. That is the correct public posture. The danger lies in the temptation, already visible in some quarters, to treat the conflict as another arena in which Washington or its regional partners must choose a side for larger geopolitical reasons—Red Sea security, countering Iranian influence, or balancing against other Gulf actors, specifically the Houthis. American policymakers have a long record of entering complex local conflicts with incomplete information, overestimating their ability to shape outcomes, and then discovering that their preferred clients commit the same atrocities they once condemned. Sudan’s civil war already illustrates the pattern. Ethiopia does not need a second demonstration.
This is going to be new levels of nightmare https://t.co/fSZAj7QK0s
— Mark Ames (@MarkAmesExiled) October 1, 2026The human costs of renewed full-scale war would be immense. Tigray has not recovered from the last conflict. Hundreds of thousands remain displaced. Food insecurity is chronic. Another blockade, another wave of drone strikes on civilian infrastructure, and another cycle of revenge killings would deepen a humanitarian catastrophe that the international system is already failing to address. History in the Horn of Africa offers little evidence that military “solutions” produce lasting political settlements. They produce exhaustion, new grievances, and the conditions for the next round of fighting.
Diplomatic pathways still exist. They require genuine inclusion of Eritrea, credible confidence-building measures, and a willingness on all sides to implement the core provisions of Pretoria rather than treat the agreement as a temporary truce to be discarded when convenient—which requires settling the federal relationship with the necessary stakeholders and permanently putting to rest the dispute between Tigray and its Amhara neighbors. Whether that political will materializes remains doubtful. What is not doubtful is that another major war in the Horn will kill large numbers of people who have already suffered enough, further destabilize an already fragile region, and create new opportunities for external powers to meddle at the expense of the local populations.
Washington’s most constructive contribution would be to stay out—genuinely stay out—and to discourage its partners from treating northern Ethiopia as a secondary front in someone else’s strategic competition. The people of Tigray, Amhara, Afar, and Eritrea do not need another proxy war. They need the fighting to stop.
Tyler Durden Fri, 10/02/2026 - 05:00Over several years of the Ukraine war, Russia and various European countries have escalated their diplomatic war - amid parallel 'spy wars' and mutual accusations of sabotage efforts - which has resulted in tit-for-tat expulsions of diplomats.
A big exception to this trend until now was Hungary under Viktor Orbán. Having served as the Prime Minister of Hungary for a near 20-year total period across two separate periods, Orbán throughout the years of the Ukraine war until his defeat by Péter Magyar was a thorn in the side of the EU for his openness to Moscow and condemnation of NATO's deepening role in propping up the Zelensky government.
via TASSPrime Minister Magyar, leader of the pro-European conservative Tisza Party, has been in office only five months and already he has drastically shifted the country on Moscow relations.
On Thursday Russia’s Foreign Ministry said it has moved to expel a group of Hungarian diplomats in a tit-for-tat action.
Starting Sept.8, Budapest under Magyar expelled ten Russian diplomats who were suspected of spying activities. Moscow in the wake of this lodged a formal and "decisive protest" over the "groundless and openly unfriendly" expulsion.
Such words would have been unthinkable under Orbán. And now, as state media confirms, several Hungarian diplomats have been sent packing:
Hungarian Charge d’Affaires in Russia Gabor Gergich, who was summoned to the Russian Foreign Ministry, was informed that, as a retaliatory measure, a group of employees of the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow and Hungarian Consulates General in St. Petersburg and Kazan must leave Russian territory, the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement.
"The Hungarian diplomat was informed that, as a retaliatory measure, a group of employees of the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow and the Consulates General of Hungary in St. Petersburg and Kazan must leave Russian territory within two weeks," the ministry said.
As for the new era of Magyar he early on made clear he would not block a €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine which Orbán originally vetoed, resulting in a collective sigh of relief among Eurocrats in Brussels.
Beyond the Ukraine funding veto, it was Orbán's refusal to submit to open borders and mass immigration that caused constant conflict with the EU.
Things are rapidly changing on multiple diplomatic fronts:
The first visit by an Estonian Foreign Minister to Hungary in seven years. 🇭🇺🇪🇪
Today, we are giving fresh momentum to our bilateral relations. Welcome to Budapest, dear @Tsahkna! pic.twitter.com/LXsidRg9e3
He was frequently referred to by the political left as a "dictator" and a "fascist" in part because of his strict border policies (even though he is voluntarily leaving office after losing the election, which is not the behavior of a dictator)
Tyler Durden Fri, 10/02/2026 - 04:15Authored by Steve Watson via Modernity.news,
The British state is compiling a list of people who criticise its own counter-terror programme. Ordinary X and Reddit users who questioned Prevent training, flagged a one-sided focus on the "far Right," or simply criticised it have had their posts logged, stored and "investigated" by a Home Office-linked unit most of them have never heard of.
Officials spent more than a year trying to keep that database secret. They only released it after an appeal to the Information Commissioner's Office. The public was never told their feeds were being trawled.
The Standards and Compliance Unit, or StaCU, was set up in February 2024 as an "opaque" body to handle complaints about Prevent, the safeguarding scheme sold as a way to stop people becoming terrorists. Documents obtained by The Metro and released by Rights & Security International show StaCU did more than wait for formal complaints.
"Social media posts criticising government policy are being listed, monitored and investigated by officials."
The government are supposed to serve the public rather than monitor those who disagree with them by Orwellian surveillance and snooping. https://t.co/mH62tNEkYV
Between March 2024 and February 2025 it made 77 "observations" of critical online comments, most of them from X, with others from Reddit and even articles in the Guardian and the Telegraph.
Jacob Smith, Freedom of Expression and Belief Team Leader at Rights & Security International, fought for a year to force the Home Office to publish the material.
"It is shocking that the government has been trawling X and Reddit to find out who has been critiquing Prevent - and then storing that information," he said. "You should be allowed to criticise government policy without being put on a list."
He added: "People should be able to express their views on social media without that being catalogued in government databases."
Many of those logged, he said, had posted without thinking "that the government might be looking at their feed and taking that data. It is in an almost private setting."
His conclusion was blunt: "It's a stark reminder that, in the government's eyes, anything you share online is fair game and could go into a file forever."
A large share of the logged posts accused Prevent training of treating the "far Right" as the main threat while skating over Islamist extremism.
One X user was recorded after calling the training "complete bullshit." They wrote: "Anyone's who done the prevent training knows it only talks about the far Right. Islam extremism isn't even mentioned."
Another poster said they "sat through Prevent training at work ... and the narrative was very much that the far Right is the biggest threat." They added: "I kid you not!"
StaCU says it tries to independently verify claims about Prevent. It managed that for only 10 percent of the posts. The unit's parent body, the Commission for Countering Extremism, sometimes replies in public, inviting the user to submit a formal complaint.
In one case, after a post accused Prevent training of "turning a blind eye to Islam," the Commission wrote: "Hello, we process and investigate complaints about Prevent and are interested in finding out more about the training referenced above. Please feel free to DM us, tweet us back, or make a formal complaint using this link."
What that reply does not say is that the user's post has already been stored in an internal government list.
It was not only anonymous accounts. Open Rights Group had a tweet recorded that said: "How data is managed and stored under the Prevent programme lacks transparency."
Sarah Lasoye, the group's Programme Manager for Pre-Crime, told The Metro: "Prevent has expanded far beyond its stated aim of identifying people considered 'vulnerable to radicalisation', and has increasingly been used to justify extensive surveillance."
She added, "It is deeply concerning to see the Prevent duty being used to enable the monitoring of people and organisations simply because they are critical of the programme. That raises serious questions about freedom of expression and the right to dissent and protest."
"There is also a troubling lack of transparency about what happens to the information gathered through this social media monitoring: how long it is retained, who it is shared with, and ultimately what the Government is using it for," Lasoye urged.
Rights & Security International says organisations including Hope Not Hate and Maslaha also appear in or around the observations. The Campaign Against Antisemitism had a post logged that did not even name Prevent. It criticised police for failing to take a Hezbollah vigil seriously. A spokesperson said: "We aren't sure whether to be flattered or concerned that StaCU has picked up a post of ours."
The group added, "If it's because we've dared to be critical of law enforcement's lax attitude toward Islamist extremism in this country, we stand by what we said and would reiterate it for as long as it takes to bring about change. But if our post was flagged because StaCU agrees with us that police forces have failed to train their officers on what Islamist terrorism looks like and which organisations are banned, we hope that the message is being received and change is coming."
That last point tracks a long-running complaint. Sir William Shawcross, in his 2023 review of Prevent, wrote: "The bar for what RICU includes on Islamism looks to be relatively high, whereas the bar for what is included on the extreme Right-wing is comparably low."
Home Office figures for the year to September 2025 showed 10,293 Prevent referrals. Twenty percent were recorded as extreme right-wing ideology. Eight percent concerned Islamist extremism.
A Home Office spokesperson said: "Prevent does not track people who may have criticised the programme, and nor does it target any particular community." The department added that keeping the public safe is "our number one priority" and that Prevent has "moved more than 6,000 people away from violent ideologies since 2015."
The documents say otherwise on the first claim. StaCU collated the posts as "open-source complaints," stored them internally, and the Home Office refused to release the list until the Information Commissioner forced its hand. Nobody outside the unit can say who else sees the file, how long it is kept, or whether it is shared with police, platforms or other departments.
This is not an isolated compliance desk. It sits inside a growing stack of state machinery built to police speech, "narratives" and online anger.
In June, we laid out how the Home Office's Research, Information and Communications Unit has been used to manage the mass-migration story - briefing police to cast concerned citizens as "unsympathetic thugs," shaping family statements after migrant-linked killings, and running a higher bar for Islamism than for the so-called extreme Right.
The same week, ministers moved to give Ofcom faster powers to block "false information" during so-called crisis events - a phrase wide enough to cover any unrest the government would rather you not describe accurately.
London Mayor Sadiq Khan had already demanded a central government social-media "disinformation" unit, complaining of an "outrage economy" while knife crime, robbery and theft climbed on his watch. "If platforms fail to act, the state must have the tools to make them," he said.
Last week Prime Minister Andy Burnham used his first United Nations speech to announce a National Centre for Information Defence - a new machine to "detect, attribute and disrupt" what ministers call hostile information attacks and to stop a "distorted and untrue narrative about Britain."
He wrapped it in Russia, bots and "community cohesion." Nigel Farage called it a Ministry of Truth. "Never ever trust this authoritarian Government," he said. Defence Secretary Wes Streeting insisted: "We're not interested in policing domestic political dissent." Labour's record is why that promise is already worn thin.
Police have their own version. The National Internet Intelligence Investigations team, stood up after the 2024 Southport riots, has referred more than 100 "suspicious" posts to local forces, including dozens tied to protest-related activity.
Officials describe it as "a dedicated function at a national level for exploiting internet intelligence." Reform UK leader Nigel Farage called it "the beginning of the state controlling free speech."
The arrest figures sit underneath all of it. Between 2021 and 2025 at least 62,199 people were arrested in Britain on suspicion of communications offences - section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, the Malicious Communications Act 1988, and the Online Safety Act's false-communications offence.
That is roughly 34 arrests a day. Big Brother Watch director Silkie Carlo said speech policing is "out of control" and called the result an "Orwellian mess." Lord Toby Young asked why authorities spend so much time "policing our tweets when they could be policing our streets."
Prevent is sold as safeguarding. The logged posts are not bomb plots. They are workers calling official training biased, campaigners asking how data is stored, and a Jewish group complaining that police treat a banned terrorist organisation too lightly.
If that is enough to enter a Home Office database, the category of "acceptable" speech is already whatever officials decide it is on a whim.
Britain does not need another unit to hunt "untrue narratives." It needs a government that can survive being questioned without opening a file on the questioner.
Tyler Durden Fri, 10/02/2026 - 03:30There are two familiar trends related to the Ukraine war which have persisted. The White House is still reportedly trying to get creative regarding some kind of deal that would east tensions between Moscow and the West - including potential sanctions relief for the release of political prisoners - but at the same time the rhetoric between Russia and Europe has gotten increasingly dangerous.
The Kremlin this week highlighted another big issue which serves as an ongoing source of broader tensions. It announced Monday that arms control talks between Washington and Moscow should have begun "yesterday".
via AFPAs it stands, there are no existent nuclear arms control treaties remaining between the globe's two biggest nuclear-armed superpowers. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warned in fresh comments that the nuclear issue remains "completely unaddressed" at this stage.
The New START nuclear arms reduction agreement officially went defunct on February 5, 2026 - as it was not renewed, amid the backdrop of war in Ukraine and ratcheted US sanctions on Russia.
Revisit our: Uncharted Territory: US & Russia Now Have No Limits On Nuclear Weapons
"This is such a complex matter that it requires very lengthy, meticulous, and expert-level negotiations. Therefore, in any case, it will be a process that takes a long time," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed in 2010 by Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, and limits the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 per side, and caps deployed delivery systems - including of missiles, bombers, and submarines - at 700.
The treaty was further designed to regulate targeting of each rival's political and military centers in a potential nuclear conflict.
The August 15, 2025 Alaska summit between Presidents Trump and Putin had as one of its many aims setting the "next stages" of discussions could include reaching "agreements in the area of control over strategic offensive weapons."
"Russia will be ready to use the entire arsenal ... including nuclear weapons, in order to defend its territory should NATO countries undertake any attempt aimed at isolating the Kaliningrad Region from the rest of the country," says a document allegedly sent by Russia to NATO… pic.twitter.com/U2meg41cju
— MenchOsint (@MenchOsint) September 30, 2026However, such an agreement has remained elusive and not even the New START Treaty survived, also given the Trump administration has long voiced that it wants to see China included in future landmark arms control deals.
Tyler Durden Fri, 10/02/2026 - 02:45